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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Justin Samuel Goetsch appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 
upon his guilty plea to sexual abuse of a child. Goetsch also challenges the 
district court's order denying his Rule 35 Motion. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Goetsch with lewd conduct with a minor under 16, and 
sexual abuse of a child under 16. (R., pp. 28-29.) The victim, R.M., was the 15-
year-old daughter of Goetsch's fiance. (R., pp. 9-10.) Based on Goetsch's prior 
conviction for a similar offense, the state pursued a persistent violator 
enhancement. (R., pp. 26-27.) 
In preparing for trial, Goetsch's counsel met with Goetsch's fiance (R.M.'s 
mother), and an investigator hired by Goetsch's family. (DePew Affidavit, 1 p. 1.) 
The investigator and fiance suggested R. M. falsely accused Goetsch of touching 
her after being raped by another man. (DePew Affidavit, p. 1.) That man was a 
former client of Goetsch's counsel. (DePew Affidavit, pp. 1-2.) Goetsch's 
counsel thus moved for appointment of conflict counsel. (R., pp. 59-60; DePew 
Affidavit, pp. 1-4.) After reviewing the affidavit of Goetsch's counsel, the district 
court granted the motion and appointed conflict counsel. (R., pp. 62, 64.) 
Ultimately, Goetsch pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a child under 16, 
1 This affidavit is included in the record as a confidential exhibit. 
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and the state dismissed the other charges. (R., pp. 95-96; Tr., pp. 4-21.) At the 
sentencing hearing, the district court considered the four goals of sentencing, 
including rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence, and emphasized that 
"protection of society is this court's primary concern." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 3-12.) The 
court noted that it had been "necessary to appoint a conflict public defender," 
resulting in "additional cost to the county," which was "a factor, but a very minor 
factor for the court to consider." (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-13.) The court then continued, 
I think the fact of the matter is that this is a second sex crime. 
the overall risk, given your sexual behavior, clearly, you do 
society and you remain a significant risk 
residence with you. 
(Tr., p. 41, Ls. 14-19.) The court sentenced Goetsch to a unified term of 25 
years with 15 years fixed. (R., p. 112.) 
Goetsch filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 124-26.) Goetsch later 
filed a Rule 35 Motion to reduce his sentence. (R., pp. 130-31.) The district 
court denied the motion without a hearing. (R., pp. 135-37.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Goetsch states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Goetsch's right to due 
process by increasing his sentence because he exercised 
the constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at government 
expense? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, 
as a factor in sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his 
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel which cost the 
county additional money? 
3. In light of the affidavit from Jenny Bateman that directly 
addressed and discredited a factor that the district court 
considered at sentencing, did the district court abuse its 
discretion when it denied Rule 35 Motion? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of 25 years, with 15 years fixed, following 
Mr. Goetsch's plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a child? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Goetsch failed to show fundamental error or an abuse of discretion 
by the district court because the record does not plainly demonstrate he 
was sentenced vindictively under Idaho law? 
2. Has Goetsch failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his Rule 35 Motion? 
3. Has Goetsch failed to show his sentence - which was within statutory 





Goetsch Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Or An Abuse Of Discretion By 
The District Court Because The Record Does Not Plainly Demonstrate He Was 
Sentenced Vindictively Under Idaho Law 
A Introduction 
Goetsch asserts the district court sentenced him in violation of his rights to 
due process and equal protection "by increasing his sentence because he 
exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at government expense." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Although Goetsch did not object at sentencing, he 
argues the alleged violation amounted to fundamental error, and is thus 
reviewable for the first time on appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Goetsch also 
argues the alleged error at sentencing was an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 9-11.) Goetsch's arguments fail because he cannot show that the 
district court sentenced him vindictively - i.e. because he exercised the right to 
conflict-free counsel - or that the exercise of his right to conflict-free counsel 
affected the outcome of proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[W]hen determining whether constitutional rights have been violated in 
light of the facts of [an] individual case," the appellate court exercises free 
review. State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 814, 229 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Ct. App. 
2010) (citing State v. Rodgers, 144 Idaho 738, 740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007)) 
(other citations omitted). In determining whether an appellant has demonstrated 
a due process violation for vindictive sentencing, the appellate court applies a 
"totality of circumstances" standard of review, examining the sentencing court's 
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comments in context, and taken as a whole. State v. Regester, 106 Idaho 296, 
299-300, 678 P.2d 88, 91-92 (Ct. App. 1984). 
On review of the district court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court 
considers (1) whether the district court understood that the issue was 
discretionary; (2) whether the district court acted within its discretionary scope 
and consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the district court 
exercised reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) 
(citation omitted). 
C. Goetsch Cannot Meet His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental Error 
A defendant's due process challenge claiming he was sentenced 
vindictively - raised for the first time on appeal - is reviewed for fundamental 
error. State v. Baker, 153 Idaho 692, 695, 290 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citing State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 529-30, 850 P.2d 176, 178-79 (1993). 
To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged 
error (1) violates an unwaived constitutional right, (2) plainly exists without need 
for information outside of the appellate record, and (3) affected the outcome of 
the proceedings. kL State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 
(2010). 
As to the first prong, the appellate court must determine if the alleged 
error "would be fundamental if there were error." Baker, 153 Idaho at 695, 290 
P.3d at 1287 (citing Robbins, 123 Idaho at 529, 850 P.2d at 178). "The right to 
be free from a vindictive sentence . . . goes to the foundation or basis of a 
defendant's rights." 19..c A vindictive sentence "would be a violation of the right to 
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due process." KL (citing State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 792, 275 P.3d 12, 18 (Ct. 
App. 2012)). Thus, an allegation of a vindictive sentence satisfies the first prong 
of the fundamental error analysis. 
Here, Goetsch contends his rights to due process and equal protection 
were violated when the district court increased his sentence "because he 
exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at government expense." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Because his claim is an assertion that he was 
sentenced vindictively, he satisfies the first prong of the fundamental error test. 
However, Goetsch fails to show an error that is plain on the record. 
There is no presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing for exercising the 
right to conflict-free counsel. See Baker, 153 Idaho at 695, 290 P.3d at 1287 
(presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing only applies where the defendant 
receives a greater sentence upon re-sentencing after retrial or remand). For a 
vindictive sentence claim, "[a] defendant must prove actual vindictiveness" by the 
sentencing judge, or "intent to punish [defendant) for exercising a right." KL 
(citing Grist, 152 Idaho at 792,275 P.3d at 18, and Robbins, 123 Idaho at 532, 
850 P.2d at 181 ). 
For a vindictive sentence claim, the appellate court applies a "totality of 
circumstances" review that is a "more subtle, narrow question" than mere abuse 
of discretion. KL (citing Regester, 106 Idaho at 300, 678 P.2d at 92). The 
Court's analysis "cannot be determined upon a single remark removed from 
context," rather, "[t]he judge's words and actions must be considered as a 
whole." Id. 
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In Baker, the court considered the appellant's claim the district court 
sentenced him vindictively for entering an Alford2 plea, whereby he did not admit 
guilt, but conceded the state would be able to prove guilt at trial. Baker, 153 
Idaho 692, 290 P.3d 1284. In Baker, the district court said, "in sex offenses 
Alford pleas are problematic with a defendant in any case." l!i at 696, 290 P.3d 
at 1288. However, the district court discussed its four considerations at Baker's 
sentencing, in particular rehabilitation and the need to protect the public. l!i 
Specifically, the district court cited Baker's statement in the PSI, "I think 
sometime the girls in these cases should be held accountable. I never forced 
anything." l!i at 697, 290 P.3d at 1289. 
Addressing the second prong of the fundamental error test, the Court of 
Appeals found, 
Baker cannot show plain error because the record does not 
demonstrate the district [sic] based the sentence on Baker's entry 
of an Alford plea per se. Instead, the court gave consideration to 
Baker's broader failure to accept responsibility and callous attitude 
about his offenses, which made him a danger to the public. 
l!i at 696, 290 P.3d at 1288. The Court noted that the district court considered 
many factors in determining Baker's sentence, and concluded: 
Upon this record, it is not clear the reference to the Alford plea was 
improper and, when taken in context, the statement on which Baker 
relies shows the district court's consideration of the Alford plea was 
one among several bases for imposing the sentence of a 
unified term of ten years, with two years determinate. 
l!i at 697, 290 P.3d at 1289 (emphasis added). 
The Baker analysis applies here. The court did not base Goetsch's 
sentence on Goetsch's exercise of the right to conflict counsel per se. See 
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Baker, 153 Idaho at 696, 290 P.3d at 1288. At Goetsch's sentencing, the district 
court said, "during the pendency of this action it was necessary to appoint a 
conflict public defender because of the assertions, either by you or other family 
members, that perhaps there was another person who committed this crime." 
(Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-9.) The DePew and Bateman affidavits demonstrate the factual 
accuracy of this statement. (DePew Affidavit, p. 3; R., p. 133.) However, 
Goetsch argues "this information should never have been used against him." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) This argument is contrary to Idaho law. 
Whether a defendant accepts responsibility for his crime is a valid 
consideration at sentencing. Baker, 153 Idaho at 698, 290 P.3d at 1290 
(sentence was not imposed to punish defendant for entering an Alford plea, but 
reflected court's concern that defendant lacked acceptance of responsibility and 
needed rehabilitation, which were properly connected to the need to protect the 
public); Kellis, 148 Idaho at 816-17, 229 P.3d at 1178-79 (comments did not 
coerce a confession, but expressed court's permissible consideration of 
defendant's continued assertion of innocence as it pertained to his amenability to 
rehabilitation). The court appropriately considered Goetsch's promotion or 
adoption of a strategy to falsely accuse a third person of his crime as evidence 
he was not accepting responsibility. 
Goetsch further contends the district court improperly considered the cost 
to the county of conflict-counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) At Goetsch's 
sentencing, the district court said, "Certainly, the defense of this crime has 
resulted in the additional cost to the county," but characterized this as a "very 
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minor factor for the court to consider." (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 10-13.) Goetsch asserts -
without factual support - that this shows "the district court obviously considered 
[the cost of conflict-counsel] to be an aggravating factor" at sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.) Goetsch then concludes - without legal support - that 
the cost of conflict-counsel "affected the outcome of the proceedings" and was 
therefore fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) Contrary to Goetsch's 
arguments, the district court's concern about the cost of conflict-counsel was -
like in Baker - just one among several bases for Goetsch's sentence.3 
At Goetsch's sentencing, the court also addressed "the related goals of 
rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence," and "protection of society [as the] 
court's primary concern." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 7-12.) The court emphasized, "the fact 
of the matter is that this is a second sex crime. Given the overall risk, given your 
sexual behavior, clearly, you do remain a significant risk to society." (Tr., p. 41, 
Ls. 14-19.) In this case, the conflict requiring new counsel was allegations that a 
former client was the actual perpetrator, allegations Goetsch knew to be false. 
That Goetsch compelled the expenditure of additional funds to pursue a theory 
he knew to be false reflected poorly on his acceptance of responsibility and 
potential for rehabilitation. As in Baker, evidence that Goetsch lacked 
acceptance of responsibility and a likelihood for rehabilitation, and that there was 
an increased need to protect the public, were permissive considerations and do 
3 Idaho law permits the district court to consider the cost of a defendant's public 
defense at sentencing, and to order its reimbursement. I.C. § 19-854(7). 
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not show vindictiveness. Baker, 153 Idaho at 698, 290 P .3d at 1290. 
Accordingly, Goetsch has failed to show clear error. 
Having failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error test, the 
Court need not address the resulting prejudice prong. Js;L (concluding analysis 
without specifically addressing the third prong, regarding effect on outcome of 
proceedings). But as already discussed, the district court addressed several 
considerations in imposing Goetch's sentence, including the goals of criminal 
punishment, with emphasis on protecting society. (See Tr., p. 39, Ls. 7-12; p. 
41, Ls. 14-19.) Also, the court specifically characterized the cost of conflict-
counsel as a "very minor factor for the court to consider." (Tr., p. 41, Ls.10-13.) 
Accordingly, Goetsch has not shown the exercise of his right to conflict-free 
counsel affected the outcome of proceedings. Because Goetsch cannot satisfy 
the second or third prongs of the fundamental error test, his argument fails. 
D. Goetsch Cannot Show The Court Abused Its Discretion At Sentencing 
As stated above, whether a district court has sentenced a defendant 
vindictively "is a more subtle, narrow question" than the question whether a court 
has abused its sentencing discretion. Baker, 153 Idaho at 695, 290 P.3d at 
1287. However, as to the broader issue, Goetsch fails to meet his burden of 
showing an abuse of discretion. Goetsch argues the district court abused its 
discretion by considering his exercise of the right to conflict-free counsel "in any 
way when fashioning an appropriate sentence." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) 
Goetsch cites no authority to support his argument. Accordingly, the issue is 
10 
waived, and this Court need not consider it. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (citing I.A.R. 35) (other citation omitted). 
But even if the Court does consider the argument, the record 
demonstrates the district court's sentence was consistent with applicable !aw, 
and imposed through an exercise of reason. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 
P .3d at 941. A term of imprisonment is reasonable, and not an abuse of 
discretion, where necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution applicable to a given case." kl (quoting State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982)). As discussed above, the court -
in sentencing Goetsch - addressed these considerations, as applied to the 
record. (Tr., p. 39, L. 3 - p. 40, L. 5.) 
About the primary consideration - protecting society - the court 
expressed, "There probably cannot be [a] more heinous crime than a sex crime 
upon a young child," particularly in the home "where young children are most 
vulnerable." (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 6-18.) After emphasizing that this was a second sex 
crime, thus indicating that Goetsch "remain[s] a significant risk to society," the 
court said it was "not convinced that [Goetsch is] appropriate for community 
based treatment." (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 20-24.) Given the district court's careful 
consideration of the objectives of criminal punishment as applied in this case, 
Goetsch has failed to demonstrate the court abused its discretion. 
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11. 
Goetsch Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
His Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
Goetsch contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
Rule 35 motion by failing to properly consider the affidavit of Jenny Bateman, 
submitted with Goetsch's motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-13.) According to 
Goetsch, the Bateman affidavit "directly addressed the misunderstanding and 
resulting prejudice generated by" the DePew affidavit, relied on by the court at 
sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) However, Goetsch's argument presumes 
the Bateman affidavit is true, which the district court rejected. The district court's 
rejection of the Bateman affidavit and acceptance of the DePew affidavit is 
supported by the record. And regardless, both affidavits demonstrate Goetsch's 
denial of responsibility. Accordingly, Goetsch cannot show the court abused its 
discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A Rule 35 Motion challenging a sentence that is within statutory limits as 
excessive is a plea for leniency, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 601, 261 P.3d 853, 878 (2011 ). On review of the district 
court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court considers (1) whether the 
district court understood that the issue was discretionary; (2) whether the district 
court acted within its discretionary scope and consistent with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the district court exercised reason. Miller, 151 Idaho 
at 834,264 P.3d at 941. 
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"When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information" provided to the 
district court after the original sentence was imposed, to support the request for 
leniency. Draper, 151 Idaho at 601, 261 P.3d at 878. On appeal, the appellate 
court "defer[s] to the trial court's findings of fact ... unless those findings are 
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence in the record and are 
therefore clearly erroneous." State v. Kesling, 153 Idaho 673, _, 315 P.3d 861, 
865 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 
641, 643-44 (1998)) (other citation omitted). 
C. The Record Supports The District Court's Credibility Determinations 
Based On The Affidavits Before It, And That The Court Properly 
Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion 
Goetsch argues the district court misunderstood the DePew affidavit as 
indicating that his trial strategy was to blame someone else for committing his 
crime. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) DePew's affidavit provided that Bateman 
told DePew the victim's allegations against Goetsch, "were false and stemmed 
not from the defendant's conduct, but rather the alleged rape of the alleged 
victim by an individual who has been a client of counsel's." (DePew Affidavit, p. 
1.) Also, "The defense which is to be proffered to the Jury involves accusing 
counsel's former client of rape of the alleged victim in the defendant's above-
entitled case." (DePew Affidavit, p. 3.) At sentencing, the district court said, 
"during the pendency of this action it was necessary to appoint a conflict public 
defender because of the assertions, either by you or other family members, that 
perhaps there was another person who committed this crime." (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 4-
13 
9.) The district court thus determined that Goetsch's defense strategy was to 
blame a third party for committing his crime. Based on the court's comment at 
sentencing, Goetsch filed a Rule 35 motion, attaching the Bateman affidavit. (R., 
pp. 130-31.) 
In her affidavit, Bateman states she never told DePew someone else 
committed the crime against R.M. (R., p. 133.) Instead, she told DePew that 
R.M. had been raped by another man. (R., p. 133.) The district court 
determined the affidavit was not credible, stating, "the assertion of Ms. Bateman 
is in direct conflict with the affidavit of [DePew]." (R., p. 137.) The district court 
further found that Goetsch's "evidence that he did not attempt to blame a third 
party for his crime ... is not supported by the record." (R., p. 137.) 
Goetsch acknowledges the "somewhat ambiguous nature" of the 
language in DePew's affidavit, yet argues that the district court's interpretation of 
DePew's affidavit is not reasonable. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) To the contrary, 
DePew's affidavit is entirely consistent with the court's interpretation, and 
supports the court's basis for granting a substitution of counsel. Goetsch notes 
that Bateman told DePew R.M. was raped by another man, but Goetsch "was 
never accused of rape," only sexual abuse. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) Goetsch 
argues this supports that "the district court failed to understand the nuance of the 
potential trial strategy." (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) The record supports that 
Goetsch failed to convince the sentencing court of this subtle nuance in his trial 
strategy. The record does not support clear error in the district court's finding. 
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See Kesling, 153 Idaho at_, 315 P.3d at 865. Goetsch has failed to show 
otherwise. 
Even if the Court were to find the district court erred in determining that 
Goetsch's strategy was to blame another for his crime, Goetsch cannot show the 
district court abused its sentencing discretion. In denying Goetsch's Rule 35 
Motion, the court wrote that its concern from the DePew Affidavit was "that the 
defendant and the family of the victim were claiming that the allegations of the 
victim as to the defendant were false." (R., p. 137.) In other words, the district 
court's concern was Goetsch's failure to accept responsibility for his crime. 
Bateman's affidavit would not have alleviated the court's concern even if the 
court had accepted it as true. Instead, Bateman's affidavit asserted that 
Goetsch's strategy was to deny responsibility by claiming he was falsely 
accused. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) 
Despite acknowledging that "[h]e certainly considered trying to deny" 
committing the crime, Goetsch suggests that the strategy that he was falsely 
accused "was the idea of Ms. Bateman and her private investigator," and "[t]here 
is no indication that Mr. Goetsch was pushing for this approach." (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 12-13.) Ironically, this argument reflects a continued effort by Goetsch 
to deflect responsibility - by shifting responsibility to Bateman and the private 
investigator. Also, contrary to Goetsch's assertion, the record indicates that 
Goetsch was committed to the approach of claiming he was falsely accused. 
In DePew's affidavit, she noted that the "defense which is to be proffered" 
conflicts with her professional obligation to a former client, requiring appointment 
15 
of conflict-counsel. (DePew Affidavit, pp. 2-4.) DePew further stated, 
"Defendant is aware, in general terms, that appointment of conflict counsel .. 
will likely require a continuance of his currently scheduled Jury Trial," but 
Defendant "has indicated that he is ready and willing to waive his speedy trial 
and would be more comfortable with a lawyer who did not have a conflict of 
interest." (DePew Affidavit, p. 4.) Thus, the record shows Goetsch was aware of 
the strategy and its ramifications, but was "ready and willing" to pursue it. 
Ultimately, it is undisputed that Goetsch's defense strategy involved 
arguing that the victim's accusations were false. Goetsch's strategy 
demonstrates his refusal to accept responsibility. As stated above, such refusal 
to accept responsibility is an appropriate consideration at sentencing. Baker, 
153 Idaho at 695, 290 P.3d at 1290. 
In addition to considering Goetsch's refusal to accept responsibility, the 
district court denied Goetsch's Rule 35 motion based on Goetsch's prior sex 
offense, probation violation, and parole violation, as demonstrated in the record. 
(R., p. 137; see PSI, p. 5.) The district court considered "the four goals of 
sentencing, and in the absence of any new or additional information[,] the 
sentence as set forth by the Court is appropriate and not excessive based on the 
defendant's prior record." (R., p. 137.) The court concluded: ''The Court, being 
aware of the Defendant's prior criminal record, and in considering the four goals 
of sentencing, does not find that the sentence imposed in this case was 
excessive, even considering the Bateman Affidavit." (R., p. 137.) 
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The district court's ruling denying Goetsch's motion for leniency was 
based on a reasoned, thoughtful consideration of necessary and appropriate 
factors. State v. Johnston, 123 Idaho 222, 226, 846 P.2d 224, 228 (Ct. App. 
1993) (criteria for reviewing orders denying leniency are the same as those for 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable, namely protecting 
society, deterrence, rehabilitating the defendant, and punishment); Baker, 153 
Idaho at 698, 290 P.3d at 1290. Goetsch therefore fails to show the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 Motion. 
111. 
Goetsch Has Failed To Show His Sentence - Which Is Within Statutory Limits -
Was Unreasonable, Given His Prior Sex Offense And Behaviors In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Goetsch argues his sentence of 25 years with 15 years fixed is excessive, 
and was thus an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-18.) Goetsch fails to meet his burden on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 888, 303 P.3d 241, 247 (Ct. App. 
2013). To carry his burden, an appellant must show his sentence "is excessive 
under any reasonable view of the facts," considering the objectives of criminal 
punishment: protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution or 
punishment. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, _, 311 P.3d 283, 285 (2013) 
(citations omitted). The appellate court "will not substitute its view of a 
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reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." State v. Delling, 152 
Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citation omitted). 
C. The Record Supports That Goetsch's Sentence Was Based On A 
Reasonable View Of The Facts, Considering The Objectives Of Criminal 
Punishment 
In sentencing Goetsch, the district court stated that it considered the four 
goals of sentencing, rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and - of "primary 
concern" - protection of society. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 5-12.) The district court later 
repeated its concern about "the significant risk to society," posed by Goetsch 
based on "his sexual behavior." (Tr., p. 41, Ls. 15-19.) The record includes 
Goetsch's prior sex offense, violations of probation and parole, and his 
admission to rubbing his girlfriend's daughter around her genitals with his hand. 
(PSI, pp. 3-6.) The district court's finding that Goetsch poses a risk to society is 
reasonable. Accordingly, Goetsch's sentence of 25 years with 15 years fixed, 
which is within the statutory limit,4 was not an abuse of the district court's 
discretion. 
Arguing his sentence is excessive, Goetsch cites mitigating factors, 
demonstrated in his PSI: that he was sexually abused as a child, suffers from 
depressive disorder and attention-deficit / hyperactivity disorder, and showed 
remorse for his crime. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16; see PSI, pp. 6-8, 10, 12-13.) 
Goetsch also asserts his first sexual offense involved a long-term consensual 
relationship between himself (then age 18) and a 14-year old girl. (Appellant's 
4 The statutory maximum for sexual abuse of a child is 25 years. I.C. § 18-
1506(5). Goetsch was sentenced to a unified term of 25 years with 15 years 
fixed. ( R., p. 112.) 
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brief, pp. 16-17; see 2004 Sex Offender Risk Assessment and Evaluation 
(attached to PSI), p. 4; see also 2012 Psychosexual Evaluation (attached to 
PSI), p. ) However, these factors - true or not - do not render the district 
court's findings and concerns unreasonable. Because the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the district court where "reasonable minds might 
differ," Goetsch must show more than the possibility of an alternative reasonable 
view. 
The Court of Appeals rejected a defendant's argument that the district 
court failed to "adequately consider applicable mitigating factors," including her 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder. State v. Quintana, 155 Idaho 124, _, 306 P.3d 
209, 213 (Ct. App. 2013). Concluding the district court did not abuse its 
sentencing discretion, the Court in that case noted the district court had reviewed 
and considered the PSI report and its attached evaluations. ~ at 215-16. Also, 
the district court "specifically considered the objectives of sentencing." ~ at 
216. 
Here, the district court considered "those factors under 19-2521 to 
determine whether probation or some form of incarceration is appropriate," and 
"reviewed in detail the presentence investigation report [PSI] as well as the 
psychosexual evaluation." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 13-15, 19-22.) The court also 
considered the "four goals of sentencing," with "protection of society [as its] 
primary concern." (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 3-9.) Given the record and the district court's 
findings and analysis at sentencing, Goetsch has failed to show his sentence is 
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Goetsch has failed to carry burden of showing 
abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction and order denying Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion. 
DATED this 12th day of February, 2014. 
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